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I begin from Aldo Facio's wonderful, awful story of writing an exam
question on whether law is an art or a science, and receiving a harsh
F with the comment 'WVho asked your opinion?" This story raises two
important questions for Latin American lawyers committed to the
perspective of gender. The first concerns whether they should make
assault on objectivity an integral part of their agenda. The second
concerns their analysis of gender and power.
I. Is LAW OBJECTIVE?
In her insightful analysis of the jurisprudence surrounding Peru's
Law on Family Violence, Rocio Villanueva Flores notes that judges
have been reluctant to apply that law on the grounds that it is a vague
statute and does not include an adequate definition of family
violence This explains the urgency of Alda Facio's sense that
feminists need to undermine the traditional notion that law is a
neutral, self-executing system of rules.
If the goal is to challenge this vision of law, one possible resource is
the so-called "indeterminacy critique" developed in critical legal
studies in the United States during the 1980s. Authors such asJoseph
William Singer and James Boyle argued that law is "indeterminate."
1. Rodo Villanueva Flores, Notas sobre interpretaionjuridica (A p"osito de 14 ley 26260y la
violenciafamiliar), inVIOLENCIACONTRALA MUJER: REnFXIONES DESDEELDERECHO (1996).
2. Se.Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94YAxE L
J. 1, 9 (1984) (stating that the law is a description of the arguments and theories that are
currently used byjudges and scholars tojustify outcomes and rules).
3. SeeJames Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Citical Legal TheMy and Local Social Thought, 133
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Others, such as Mark Kelman deconstructed legal arguments by
"trashing" legal arguments' claims to objectivity.4 Robert Gordon
showed how existing patterns of argumentation served to "freeze
social reality" and make alternative visions seem implausible5 This
critique often focused on rights, which were attacked on the grounds
that they alienated people from authentic expressions6 or that they
blinded people to utopian possibilities.7
It is nice to know one does not have to reinvent the wheel, but
several notes of caution are in order. First, having read both the
indeterminacy literature and the Villanueva article, it seems to me
that Villanueva knows most of what was said within critical legal
studies in the 1980s, and that in many ways, she says it better.
A second question is whether this is a battle feminists want to fight.
Within American jurisprudence it proved bitter and divisive, with
constant charges that the objectivity-critiquers were "nihilists" whose
only interest was in trashing. The very considerable costs of this
battle are heightened in Latin America for two reasons.
In the United States, the indeterminacy critique drew upon a
tradition already well-established within American law. The legal
realists attacked the idea that law is neutral and objective in the
1920s, drawing upon a still older tradition ofjurisprudence dating to
Oliver Wendell Holmes My understanding of Latin American
jurisprudence remains sketchy, but my impression is that Latin
American countries generally lack a tradition similar to legal realism.
If this is true, a critique of objectivity will place feminists in a much
more exposed position than critical legal scholars in the United
States.
The potential exposure is even greater for another reason. The
final session of the Pan American Conference suggests that a critique
of objectivity, in the Latin American context, pits feminists squarely
against other progressive forces whose identities have been forged by
U. PA. L. REv. 685, 779 (1985) (arguing that the law is somewhat indeterminate shaped by
social subjectivism and structural strands).
4. See Mark Kelman, Trashing 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984) (defining "trashing" as the
theory which takes specific arguments in their own terms, discovers that they are "foolish" and
then looks externally for some order in the internal chaos).
5. Robert W. Gordon, Unfretzing Legal Realty: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 RA. ST. U. L.
REV. 195 (1987).
6. Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning S RES. IN L. & SOc. 25 (1980).
7. Robin West, Murdering the SpiriL Racism, Rights & Commerce, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1771
(1992).
8. See WHInIAM W. FISHER II, MORTON J. HORWITE, THOMAS REED, AMERICAN LEcAL
REAUSM (1993); OliverW. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897) (arguing
that the legal system is inconsistent in its objectivity).
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advocacy of human rights and the rule of law. Human rights
advocates, who have forged their identities through fights against
repression and dictatorship, generally have rested their claims for
authority and legitimacy on the charge that existing authorities have
violated universal norms.
The language of human rights rests heavily on notions of
universality of the type that the critique of objectivity targets. Thus, a
feminism focused on the jurisprudential issue of whether objectivity is
possible pits feminists' claims for legitimacy against those of other
progressive forces in Latin America. Is this wise? It seems to me that,
in a tnachisa culture, the perspective of gender is threatening enough
without burdening it with this additional fight.
Do any alternatives exist? Two deserve consideration. One is to
argue in a pragmatist vein, stressing what law is, rather than what it is
not. While law is not a neutral, self-executing system of rules, it is not
totally indeterminate either.9 The processes by which language
generates meaning are related less to logic than to the form of life of
which the language is a part; law is part of language. '° The key point,
from a pragmatist perspective, is that certainty represents a statement
about the role a tenet plays in one's form of life, not a statement
about some ultimate truth with which agreement of all rational
beings is, or should be, automatic."
Yet even this formulation presents difficulties. Although in my
writings outside of feminism I am best known as a critic of objectivity,
I do not carry that intellectual agenda into my writings on gender.
For one thing, people often confuse objectivity critiques with the
belief that nothing is true, so that one's feminist credos are quoted
back as evidence of self-contradiction.12 This is silly: it mistakes a
conversation on epistemology, on what truth claims mean, with a
claim that truth claims are incoherent. These are technical issues,
best left for conversations on philosophy. Conversations on gender
9. SeeJoan Williams, Citical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdels, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 588 (1987) (stating that both arguments are premised upon an
"either/or" approach);John Stick, Can Nrhilism be Pagmatic, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986)
(arguing that practical legal reasoning and process demonstrates how the indeterminate
argumentfails).
10. See LUDWIG WITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
3d ed. 1968) (stating that the definition of the law is dependent upon the society over which it
governs).
11. SeeJoan C. Williams, Sympasium: MidhaelJ Penyr's Morality, Politics, and Law: Abortion,
Incommensurability, and Jurisprudence 63 TUL L. REV. 1651 (1989) (critiquing absolutes and a
persisting focus on the way viewpoints may affect perceptions).
12. Se4 e.g., Dennis Patterson, Postmodemism/FeminismlLaw, 77 CORNELLL. REV. 254 (1992)
(questioning the viability of feminism during postmodern critique of reason).
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are already too fraught with difficulties to allow these issues to enter
and confuse.
An alternative approach is to entirely evade profound questions
concerning objectivity. In the context of gender, the key problem is
that even conceding that objectivity is possible, courts and legislatures
fail to live up to their own stated standards of objectivity in their
treatment of women. Thus, the Peruvian Law on Family Violence is
not enforced on the grounds that it is too vague, whereas other
equally vague laws are enforced without comment. One does not
have to engage in philosophical discussions to mark this as
inappropriate and unfair.
From the perspective of gender, all we need to show is that current
laws, and the ways they are interpreted, do not live up to their own
claims to objectivity. Let human rights advocates argue that law can
be neutral and objective; we may disagree, or argue that its objectivity
means something much more complex and contingent than they
assume. But the key point for feminists is that, bracketing the
question of whether law is ever objective, the laws we object to are
not.
II. WHICH ANALYSIS OF GENDER AND POWER?
My second brief comment concerns gender and power. Ten years
of work in feminist jurisprudence in the United States has informed
me about the relationship between gender and power. But it has also
confused me, in ways that only began to clear up when I read Alda
Facio's subtle and astute Cuando el Genero Suena, Cambios Trae s
Feminist jurisprudence in the United States often elides the
question of whether feminists need an analysis of gender and power.
Catherine MacKinnon's analysis of gender as dominance has many
strengths. Her theory picked up a theme that has been around since
the early years of second-wave feminism, for example in the
influential Desire and Power4 and has developed it into a full-blown
theory of gender. MacKinnon's sustained analysis of the ways our
sexuality eroticizes dominance and submission is an important and
enduring contribution, and has been accompanied by movements
designed to separate power from desire in the workplace (sexual
harassment law), the home (domestic violence law), and in
entertainment (pornography).
13. ALDAFAcIO, CUANDoELGENERoSUENACAMBIOSTRAE (1996).
14. Catherine A. MacKinnon, De.ire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSE ON
LIFEAND LAW 46 (Catherine Stimpson ed., 1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED].
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Far more controversial is MacKinnon's claim that the linkage of
power and desire is the chief engine of gender. This not only posits
the controversial and divisive claim that a single engine drives the
extremely complex phenomenon of a gendered world; it also glosses
over the tradition of socialist feminism, which points to the structure
of work and family as a key engine in the "gender factory."'5 Gender
can usefully be linked both to the structure of sexuality and to the
structure of work and family. This is one important way MacKinnon's
analysis needs to be reassessed.
The second is even more basic. MacKinnon's analysis attributes to
power an on-off quality that links men with power and women with
powerlessness. "[O]n the first day that matters, dominance was
achieved, probably by force.' 6  This kind of talk is useful for
achieving one of the key goals of feminism: women bonding in anger
against men (consciousness-raising). It is far less effective at building
successful coalitions for gender change. Many women are repulsed
by the notion that they are men's victims. They don't feel like
victims, and believe that feminists' descriptions make them sound like
losers. The critiques of MacKinnon that illustrate this point are often
called the agency critiques Many men, particularly men of color
and working dass men, become outraged when they are described as
privileged. In fact, they don't feel privileged; they feel oppressed by
race, class, dictatorship, or other social forces. Working class women
and women of color often agree, and point out ways that their
experience of gender differs due to their different class and race
contexts. The critiques that make these points are often called the
anti-essentialism critiques. '
Agency and anti-essentialism critiques often pinpoint analytical
failures of MacKinnon's analysis of gender and power. But the
important point is that these analytical failures undercut the ability of
MacKinnon's language to persuade a broad range of audiences.
Because of their extensive experience with gender trainings and
popular education, feminists in Latin America are developing a
15. See SARAH F. BERK, THE GENDER FACrORY: THE APPORTIONMENT OFWORK IN AMERICAN
HOUSEHOLDS (1985); Marion Crain, Betwen Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Se=
Equality, andLaborSpvedz, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903 (1994) (discussing the "hierarchy" in the home and
the workplace).
16. F .m sm UNMODMIEID, supra note 14, at 40.
17. Sat, ag., Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux Agency and Coercion in Feminist LeAL Theory, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 304 (1995) (discussing the way women view themselves and are viewed by
others).
18. Se, ag., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581 (1990) (eluding to the point that gender is not the only variable in the way women are
treated).
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language of gender and power with the ability to overcome the
drawbacks of MacKinnon's dominance feminism. Alda Facio's
analysis of stereotypes points the way. The brilliantly simple "When
He Works/When She Works," which Alda Facio adopts from what
appears to be a popular education bulletin, sets up two columns:
He Works:
He has a photo of his family on his desk.
He's a solid family man, conscious of his responsibilities.
He speaks with his colleagues. He must be discussing his latest
deal.
He's not in his office. He's meeting with the delegates.
He lunches with the General Manager. Surely he's going to get a
raise.
She Works:
She has a photo of her family on her desk.
Her family will alwas come before her career.
She speaks with her colleagues. She's gossiping.
She's not in her office. She took off to go shopping.
She lunches with the General Manager. They must be lovers.
This stunningly concrete example gives a graphic picture of gender
power at work, in a way that invites laughter, and in my experience,
gets it, even in audiences not receptive to the gender perspective. It
is an approachable way to talk that presents gender power as
something that happens, quite innocently, in an everyday way to
transform our societies into what MacKinnon has called "an
affirmative action plan for white men."' 9 In the United States, this is
useful because it graphically illustrates the limitations of our
discrimination laws, which are interpreted to limit actionable
discrimination to that which is conscious and intentional. It also
demonstrates the limitations of an affirmative action jurisprudence
that often assumes that the purpose of affirmative action is to remedy
past discrimination. 2 The He Works/She Works analysis shows that
much of the most damaging discrimination, far from being
intentional, is not even conscious. It also shows that affirmative
19. FEbINSM UNMODIFIED, supranote 14, at 36.
20. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racinm, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that equal protection laws should
protect against unconscious racial discrimination).
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action is important not to remedy past discrimination by people long
dead, but to remedy the disadvantage created by these and other
stereotypes in the present and subconscious default modes within
which we all normally function.
What's needed is a new metaphor that crystallizes these insights.
The central metaphor of MacKinnon's dominance feminism, taken
from Angelina Grimke, is of men's boot on our neck.2' This
functions well as a language of bonding in anger against men, but less
well as a language of persuasion. An alternative is the metaphor of
gender as a force field, pulling men and women back towards
conventional gender patterns, and perpetuating power differentials
through destructive stereotypes that still serve today to undercut the
credibility of women and bolster that of men. '
]II. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, although I remain deeply indebted to MacKinnon
for her brilliant analysis of how our culture eroticizes dominance, my
experiences in Latin America convince me that North American
theorists have much to learn from Alda Facio and others. Their
experience can help guide North American feminists as we move out
of our comfortable but marginalized conversations among ourselves,
and begin to engage in some popular education of our own.
United States feminism began in the popular sphere, and needs to
be revitalized there. I speak as a theorist committed to the
continuation of theoretical discourse. But I am convinced that we
must look south for a feminist experienced in talking about gender
in ways capable of reaching a broad popular audience.
21. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A
Conversation, 34 BuFF. L. REV. 11 (1985) (suggesting that women's actions are controlled by
men).
22. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RECONSTRUCTING GENDR: WORK, FAMILY, AND GENDERTALK IN THE
21" CENTURY (forthcoming 1998).
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